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Gerrit Smith Broadside and Pamphlet Collection

Gerrit Smith on the bailing of Jefferson Davis.

Smith, Gerrit, 1797-1874.

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Call number: Smith 540

GERRIT SMITH

on the

BAILING OF JEFFERSON DAVIS.

On my return home from Virginia, I find in the newspapers and correspondence lying upon my table much dissatisfaction with my having signed Jefferson Davis' Bail-Bond. One, and another inquire why I took this step.

I readily admit the right of the public to know my reasons for any of my public acts.

My first reason for signing the Bond was that Mr. Davis was entitled either to his trial or to his liberty. That the prisoner should have a speedy trial is a general proposition, which no one combats. There may have been sufficient reasons for unusual delay in trying Mr. Davis: - hardly, however, for a delay of two years. But not even then was there willingness to try him then : - and this, too, notwithstanding Mr. Davis had, all this time, been urgent for his trial. My second reason for signing the Bond was that the intelligent gentlemen, who bad the making up of the list of names to go upon it, invited me to sign it.

I am too little of a lawyer to argue the question whether it was legally right to admit Mr. Davis to bail. But I am enough of a man to know that I should have shown myself to be very little of a man if, after the Court had decided the case to be a bailable one, and after my name was amongst those selected to be the bail, I had refused to give it. Why my name was selected or why Mr. Greeley's was, has never been told me. But looking, as we both did, upon his long imprisonment without a trial to be a great cruelty to Mr. Davis and a great wrong to the millions imprisoned and wronged in him their representative, Mr. Greeley and I could not have been just men, and most emphatically not merciful men, had we withheld our names. I heard at Richmond, I cannot say how correctly, that it was decided [desired] to have persons sign the Bond, who would represent different sections of the country and its different kinds of politics. Perhaps, I did not hear that the Court desired this. I certainly did not hear that it required this, or made it directly or indirectly a condition of admit ting Mr. Davis to bail. And, yet, it is easy to conceive that, in such a case as this, the Court would and should allow itself to be more or less influenced by the public sentiment; and would and should feel more free to act as it did, if persons of different parts of the country and of different politics called for the action. Even a Court, however single its aim to do justice should ever be, is not in every case to disregard the public sentiment and to be deaf to the public voice. Some of the Newspapers, which assail Mr. Greeley, admit that they would have been willing to have Mr. Davis bailed exclusively by Southern men. But they do not show that he could have been bailed without a mixture of Northern names.

I need not say another word to justify my signing the Bond, nor to show that I was really under a moral obligation to sign it. I will, however, mention things, that would have evidenced my great inconsistency - some of them, perhaps, my peculiar inconsistency - had I refused to sign it.

1st. From the time the South laid down her arms, I had been writing and speaking to prove that she ought not to be charged with treason. It must be borne in mind, that Mr. Davis was detained in prison under an indictment for treason, and for nothing else. This clamor against Mr. Greeley for bailing a man, charged with the assassination of the President and the starvation of the prisoners, is entirely unreasonable and unfair. For neither of these offences has Mr. Davis been indicted ; and, instead of harping upon them in order to prejudice the public mind against the bailing of him, there should not have been the slightest reference to them in any of the strictures upon that bailing. Had Mr. Davis' detention in prison been under an indictment for either of these offences instead of for treason, Mr. Greeley would, perhaps, have declined going bail for him. Though, even in that case, and prejudicial and revolting as would have been such an indictment, Mr. Greeley's characteristic humanity would have strongly sympathized with the prisoner, who had, for two long and weary years, been pleading in vain for his trial. Moreover. Mr. Greeley, like every just man, does not allow himself to feel sure that the accused is guilty until he is found to be guilty. And he thinks that they, who are sure that Mr. Davis is guilty of one or both of these horrible offences, and are yet taking no steps to bring him into Court and to prove his guilt, have no right to insist that others shall, like themselves, believe without proof, and condemn without trial. But, to return to my reference to certain of my writings and speeches. In these writings and speeches I admitted that, had the North carried on the War under the Constitution, she would have had the right to hold the South guilty of treason. But I argued that, as she elected to carry it on under the law of war - under international instead of municipal law - she lost this right. By the way, it is easy to prove that, had she elected otherwise, our nation would, in all probability, have been permanently divided, if not, indeed, brought, from one end to the other, under Southern rule and the presence of Southern institutions. The masses of the South were in that low state of civilization, which welcomes a "no quarter war" - a "black flag war" - and which makes its subjects very efficient for carrying on such a war. On the other hand, the more cultured masses of the North would have said : "Let these barbarians go! Let these devils go ! Rather than have such a war upon our hands, let the nation be divided!" But, as I have already intimated, the end might not have been the division of the nation, but the Southern ruling and the Southernizing of the whole nation. The simple truth is that we made a bargain with the South, however we may now be tempted to deny it, or to break it. Our Generals, in the terms of the surrender of the Southern armies, recognized this bargain - this bargain that we should treat each other not as traitors under Constitutional law, but as belligerents under the law of war. The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held that this was the bargain. Alas, the ineffable meanness, the revolting infamy, of our breaking this bargain, now, when we have it in our power to break it! Alas, what a poor use is this to which to put the power of victory! How it dims the glory and reduces the value of the victory ! The shame of defeat is as nothing compared with the shame of abusing the power of success. The holding of Juarez or some ether Mexican Chief for treason, in case we should conquer Mexico, would be a no more gross, a no more immoral, breach of faith than is our holding Jefferson Davis for it. No wonder that the enlightened and sensitive men of the South are stung to the quick by our perfidy ! We may not recover so far from our passion and prejudice, as [unreadable] be ashamed of this perfidy - but our children will be ashamed of it. Who doubts, for even one moment, that [unreadable]e North, had she been conquered in this War, would have claimed at the hand of her conqueror the humanities

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of the law of war - of that law, which knows no treason. Are we doing as we would be done by ? I said the law of war knows no treason. I add that treason ceases just when and where the acknowledgment of belligerent rights begins. Reason teaches this. Humanity teaches this. The political liberalists of Europe beseech us to believe this. They tell us that they mean to undertake, from time to time; to overturn their despotic and oppressive Governments : and that nothing could be worse for them than when, now and then, they shall be conquered, to have it in the power of the conqueror to plead the example of liberal America for charging them with treason.

2d. I have ever held that a sufficient reason why we should not punish the conquered South is that the North was quite as responsible as the South for the chief cause of the War. The North did quite as touch as the South to uphold slavery : - and let me all that she did it more wickedly because more calculatingly. Slavery was the evil inheritance of the South - but the wicked choice, the adopted policy, of the North. The unfortunate South felt that she must take slavery for better or for worse, for gain or for loss. But the mercenary North coolly reckoned the political, commercial and ecclesiastical profits of slavery, and held to it.

3d. Another thing to prove my inconsistency had I refused to sign Mr. Davis' Bail-Bond, I must not shrink from mentioning. I should be wanting in candor and frankness, did I not admit that one of the strongest influences upon me when signing it was my deep conviction that the South bad already suffered enough - yes, and quite too much. By the way, one of my long-cherished doctrines is that the sufferings of the conquered party in every civil war are quite enough without superadding punishments at the close of it. A sad mistake is it in the present conquering party in Mexico to hold the contrary of this doctrine. It is argued that such punishments will warn and intimidate; and thus serve to prevent wars. But a sounder philosophy teaches that they will exasperate and brutalize, and thus tend to multiply wars. The following of the present Mexican War with bloodshed will help to keep Mexico a land of frequent and almost incessant wars. On the other hand, the closing of it in the spirit of forgiveness would soften the nation's heart, and prepare it to receive the seed of that higher civilization amongst whose fruits are the enduring Peace and established order for the lack of which Mexico, though so favored by Nature, is still so improsperous and unhappy. There is but one legitimate, and indeed but one peaceful, way to prevent civil wars - and that is justice on the part of Government. Had our Government been just - ever just, entirely just - instead of being ever a flagrant oppressor of the poor - this horrid War would not have been. There would then have been no high-souled Garrisons and Phillipses to agitate, and no high-souled John Browns to feel the uncontrollable inspirations of their burning words. I add that justice - deep and loving justice - on the part of one nation toward another is a preventive of foreign wars no less sure than is such justice on the part of Government toward its people a preventive of civil wars.

Holding then, as I do, the doctrine that the conquered nation in every civil war has suffered enough in the War to make quite unnecessary her punishment on the return of Peace, I would have had no punishment inflicted upon the South after her surrender - no punishment, however ingenious the arguments to prove that she was chargeable with treason no punishment, even if she alone had been responsible for the War. The work, now, of the conquering North should be not to punish but to comfort; not to open wounds afresh, but to perfect their healing; not to repel the Southern heart, but to win it. It is true that we could do no less than kill slavery. But that was not punishing the South. To have left it alive would have been to fail of removing the occasion for another and a speedy war. And we could do no less than give the blacks the ballot. Nor did we in this punish the South. Not to have given it to them would have been to leave our magnanimous and indispensable allies in virtual slavery - a virtual slavery, too, which might, under this vital deprivation, have soon become literal slavery. But, having abolished slavery and enfranchised the negro, we should stop there and impose no other conditions of Peace. In making Peace, the conqueror, as a general rule, is not to disturb the institutions and usages of the conquered people. Very seldom should there be any exceptions to this rule, save such as provide indispensable securities for himself or his allies. Such are the exceptions which we have made: and now we should leave the State Governments of the South to supply the systems of education, that their black and white constituencies call for. The very large landed estates of the South should be divided into small homes for the white and black poor of the South: and perhaps the State Governments of the South might, by purchase and otherwise, lend a helping hand toward bringing about such division. The owners of many of these large estates would sell them very cheap. The policy of the Federal Government, in respect to lands for the landless, is very liberal. In the light of all this and of the fact that the whole South will soon see that the poor are made better, happier and safer citizens by owning homes, the acquisition of them by her homeless whites and blacks will be found much more easy and common than is now generally apprehended.

The black man does not need confiscation; nor does be need the disfranchisement of any class of the whites. Perhaps, I once thought that he would need both if he were denied the ballot. But, now, that he has the ballot, I feel sure that he needs neither. With the ballot in his hand he can protect his person and property and, having this protection, it will be his own fault, if he does not become the owner of a home and a happy sharer in the common comforts of life.

I need not say that I should rejoice to see the black men of the South enjoying all that the most ardent abolitionists claim for them. But I would be very careful not to let my one-sided benevolence carry me too far in compelling the whites to do for the blacks. I would not unnecessarily set the whites against the blacks. I would not demoralize the blacks by encouraging them to expect what they do not fairly earn. Nor would I damage both blacks and whites by depriving any class of whites of rights enjoyed by the blacks. Great is my fear that this demanding of too much for the blacks, as conditions of "Reconstruction" and terms of Peace between the North and South, will not only injuriously affect their spirit and character, but will, in the end, leave them in possession of less rights, less property, less advantages than would have been cheerfully conceded to more moderate demands for them.

4th. Another reason for my signing the Bond (though it can hardly be said that it would have stamped me with inconsistency for refusing to sign it) was my belief that the South would regard the bailing of Mr. Davis as an expression of Northern good feeling toward herself. The people of Richmond did hail it as such. Richmond like "the City of Shushan, rejoiced and was glad." Her people, like the delivered Jews, "had light and gladness and joy." Often did I hear them say that now, for the first time, they had bright skies - that now, for the first time, they believed that there would be a true Peace between the North and South. Some ascribed these happy effects to the great and good Meeting held in Richmond the day after Mr. Davis was bailed. This Meeting, which Mr. Greeley addressed with his characteristic philanthropy and sincerity and with his unsurpassed power for communicating with the common mind, did indeed send sweet and soothing influences not only through Richmond but through the whole South. It must be remembered, however, that it was the bailing of Mr. Davis, which prepared the way for this Meeting, and gave it

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principal interest and effect. These sweet and soothing influences of which T have spoken! - alas, how sad that any portion of the Northern press should lend itself to the bad work of arresting and wasting them ! How much better that it should be augmenting and perpetuating these influences than be pouring out vials of wrath on Jefferson Davis, and be reviving angry feelings between the North and South! I trust, however, that the South will not put the most unfavorable construction on this mischievous course of so many of our newspapers. Their editors are not, after all, so hostile to the South, to Mr. Davis or to the bailing of him, as they may appear to be. They love to find, or, if they cannot find, to make an occasion for driving at the Great American Editor. A few of them have old grudges to feed. A few of them are moved by envy. But the great majority of them have, doubtless, no more unamiable purpose in this episode than to keep in the fashion and keep in with their Party.

I have, now, said all that was necessary, and, indeed, much more than was necessary, in defence of the bailing of Mr. Davis. But I cannot close this Paper without adding that the road to a speedy and a stare Peace between the North and South is, in my view, a very plain one. All that it is wise for us to require on the part of the South is that she shall give, in her laws, her press, her assemblies, and everywhere, abundant proof that she acquiesces n the abolition of slavery and in negro suffrage. The Northern Democratic Press, instead of hindering her from doing this, should encourage her to do it. Foolish as well as wicked is the editor, is the party, that, in this day of the rapid and resistless progress of the cause of human rights both in Europe and America, attempts to stem it! There are still many discontented spirits in the South, who, instead of accepting the inevitable living present, are hugging the dead past and hoping for the return not only of negro disfranchisement, but even of negro slavery. These Northern words, which daily minister to the vain hopes of those discontented spirits, do more than all things else to keep the South from taking her true and necessary attitude.

I spoke of what was to be required of the South. It is true, that there will be much more for her to do. But we must trust her to do it, instead of requiring her to do it. I admit that she would not do it, were she to be still the slaveholding South. But a new and very different spirit will rule her in her new relations, She, who was the enemy of Freedom, will now be the friend of Freedom. She, who was the enemy of human rights, will now be the friend of human rights. She, who crushed the lowly, will now lift up the lowly. She, who looked upon popular education as her greatest danger, will now regard it as her greatest safety. She, who cared not that her poor have homes, will now, in all practicable ways, facilitate their acquisition of homes.

I pass from what must be required of the South to what must be required of the North. I made but two requirements of the South. I make but two of the North. In the first place, she must relieve the disfranchised class of the Southern whites of their political disabilities. No possible good can come from this disfranchisement: and its effects on both blacks and whites are bad, very bad. Instead of diminishing the political influence of its subjects, it does by means of the, sympathy, which it begets for them, increase it. It is true that the intent of the disfranchisement was not to set the blacks above the whites - but the loyal above the disloyal. Nevertheless, it does set the blacks above the whites: and, by thus irritating the one and inflating the other, it works evil to both. In the next place, the North must hasten to put an end to these threats of confiscation. Congress ought to say without one dissenting voice, and at the earliest day, that there should be no confiscation. The disfranchisement I have just referred to is galling and, as the masses believe, insulting to its subjects. But these threats, paralyzing the industry of the South, and making even her bread uncertain, are infinitely less bearable. They are fatally in the way of her material prosperity. With the cloud they bring upon her titles, she can neither sell her lands nor borrow upon them. What could be a more trying disability to an agricultural people, who are destitute of money !

That strong and patriotic man, Thaddeus Stevens, would have certain losses of loyal men repaired. I would myself be glad to see a liberal percentage paid upon them. He would provide the means out of confiscation and at the expense of the South. I out of the national treasury and at the expense of the nation. There are three things, which, in urging confiscation, Mr. Stevens seems to forget. 1st. that the North as well as the South was guilty of the war. 2d. that whilst the North is still very rich, the South, exhausted by that war for which the North in common with herself was responsible, is exceedingly poor. 3d. that confiscation, once entered upon, it will be. difficult if not impossible, to set limits to the spread of its demoralizing power: The spirit of lawless greed engendered by confiscation will no more stop at State or other lines than will the flames of a prairie-fire at the word of command. Let there be confiscation in the South for the benefit of these Mr: Stevens' loyal losers and also for the benefit of the poor blacks as he also proposes - and, very soon under its debauching influence, immense numbers at the North will be clamoring, in the name of "Agrarianism," "Equalization" and other taking names, for their neighbors' possessions. And these rich possessions, it must be remembered, will kindle the spirit of robbery, as can none of the poor possessions of the desolated South.

These four requirements responded to - these four conditions of "Reconstruction" exacted and no others exacted - Peace between the North and South would be sure to follow. But to make this Peace more speedy and more cordial - in other words, to effect with the least delay an enduring heart-union between the North and South - there must be one thing more. Our Government is getting in the way of buying territory. There is a purchase it can make, which would be immeasurably more important and profitable than the purchase of any territory. Let it buy the Southern heart: - worth more to us than a thousand Alaskas - nay, than all Russia. There is one way, and only one way, by which it can be bought - and that is by proving to the South that the North loves her - that the North has a heart to give in exchange for her heart. Political concessions and liberal terms of "Reconstruction" do not prove it. They pass for but the cold calculations of cold statesmanship. Let the Government, in the light of the fact that the North is largely responsible for the War and is still rich whilst her sister is impoverished, use ten or twenty millions in ways most essential to relieve the sufferings of the South, and let it also exonerate her from direct Federal taxes for a few years - and the South will then believe that we pity and love her: - and our producing this belief in her will be our buying of her heart. One thing more in this connexion - the streams of private charity from the North to the South should be deepened and multiplied. And how too could the Government use fifty millions more in a wiser way than in lending it on a moderate interest (say five per cent) to the Seceded States - to each of them its proportion of the loan, estimating that proportion by the amount of its population, and the amount of its material losses in the War ? A condition of the loan should be that the State in each case shall wisely and humanely distribute its said proportion amongst owners of real estate in return for mortgages thereon drawing say but very little, if any more interest than the State has to pay. Would this be to overlook the landless poor, and to fall in with the bad maxim: "Let Government take care of the rich, and the rich will take care of the poor ?" Oh no ! - this would be to make room for the labor of the landless poor and for their acquisition of means to become landholders themselves, Moreover, there are exceedingly few men in the South, who remain rich.

But it will be said that all this will cost a great deal of money. The greater the cost, the greater the proof of our love. But the cost will be little compared with the gain, that will come of it. This investment in

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the Southern heart will be unspeakably the best investment the nation ever made. Even in a mere pecuniary view, no other will compare with it - the heart-union between the North and South, which it will produce, having more effect than aught else to raise the credit of our nation with capitalists. Were the union of the North and South cemented by their mutual love; our Government could borrow at an interest not exceeding four per cent.

This problem of Peace between the North and the South ! - how difficult it is for our statesmen to solve it! But how easily could love solve it! Let the North and South love each other - and, as they then will, for give and help and bless each other. This will be Peace ! and nothing short of it will deserve to be called Peace ! Into the enjoyment of this true Peace the nation should have entered more than two years ago. From the time that the South surrendered, no man and no woman either in the North or in the South should any longer have known, in our political strifes and divisions, a North or a South. Hearts, estranged from each other by the War and its antecedents, should then have begun to flow together in so strong a love for the nation, as would save it, forever after, from being broken asunder.

PETERBORO, June 6, 1867.