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ALBANY:
S.W. GREEN, PATRIOT OFFICE.
1847.
PETERBORO, November 1, 1847.
S. P. CHASE, Esq., Cincinnati:
MY DEAR SIR-At the National Convention of the Liberty party, held in Buffalo, 20th last month, I introduced the following resolution:
"Whereas the pro-slavery obligations of the Federal Constitution are found solely in the abundant speculations on the intentions of that instrument: and whereas its anti-slavery obligations are palpable from its plain declarations: - Resolved, therefore, that, relying on these declarations, and refusing to be misled by those speculations, we hold, that slavery, whether in the District of Columbia, or in any other part of the Nation, is clearly and utterly unconstitutional."
It is not too much to say, that you contributed largely to the defeat of the Resolution. The opposition of a gentleman, who, to his many other titles to the esteem of the Liberty party, adds that of being an eminently able constitutional lawyer, could not have failed to be very effective.
Will you permit me to ask you to look again at the Resolution? You will pardon my impatience to gain your approval of it, when you reflect, how loudly the cause of the slave calls for that approval.
I have, for many years, seen on the face of the Con-
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stitution power to abolish every part of American slavery. But, formerly, I did not claim, that this power should be exercised to its full extent. One of the pro-slavery speculations on the intentions of the Constitution is, that the Federal Government was not to demand the abolition of slavery in the "old thirteen States." In common with most abolitionists, I deferred to this speculation, and left the slavery of those States to their own disposal. Now, however, for a considerable length of time, I have turned my back on all such speculations; and have been in favor of taking the Constitution just as it reads. Taking it just as it reads, we, of course, come, promptly, to the conclusion, that it enjoins the abolition of every part of American slavery. And, why should we not take it, just as it reads? Whence, indeed, our permission to take it otherwise? Most emphatically, whence our permission to do so, for the purpose of making out a case against the most essential and sacred human rights?
In its preamble, we find, that the Constitution is not a den of Slavery; but a temple of Liberty. A temple of Liberty, I say; - for the Goddess herself stands in its vestibule. We learn from the preamble, that one of the objects of ordaining and establishing the Constitution was "to secure the blessings of liberty." Passing on, we find, that the Constitution harmonizes with the preamble - the temple with the vestibule. For instance, the Constitution provides, that "the right of the people to
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be secure in their persons, &c., against unreasonable searches and seizures shall riot be violated;" and that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;" and that "the United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government." Now, who can doubt, that this language does, on the face of it, and by every rational and just construction of it, give power to abolish every part of American slavery?
But, it is said, that there are passages in the Constitution, which are pro-slavery. In what sense, however, are they pro-slavery? If they do not require the upholding of slavery, nor forbid the abolition of it, then, whether they are, or are not, proslavery, is wholly foreign to the question before us; for, then, they do not stand in the way of the exercise of the distinct, and positive, and sufficient, anti-slavery powers of the Constitution - its distinct, and positive, and sufficient powers for abolishing every part of American slavery.
Is it said, that the provision, which refers to the importation of African slaves (, for such I admit to be its reference,) is a pro-slavery taint upon the Constitution? Whether so, or not, is immaterial to our present argument. Does it stand in the way of the abolition of American slavery by the Federal Government? That is the only pertinent question. It manifestly does not; - for it expired by its own limitation, forty years ago.
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I have specified several of the anti-slavery powers of the Constitution. This provision, respecting the African slave-trade, calls to mind, and stands in connection with, another of its anti-slavery powers. It is the power to regulate commerce. It was taken for granted, that this power would be used, as it afterwards was used, to abolish the African slave trade. And, well, might it be taken for granted, - for the only remaining friendship for the trade was confined to South Carolina and Georgia. Even North Carolina, by the tax she had imposed upon it, had, in effect, prohibited it within her borders. To conciliate a handful of persons in two of the States, the exertion against the African slave-trade of the power to regulate commerce was restrained for nineteen years. This is to be regretted. Nevertheless, this temporary restraint of one of its anti-slavery powers did not restrain then, and much less does it restrain now, any other of the antislavery powers of the Constitution.
I said, that the African slave-trade was abolished under the power to regulate commerce. The great extent of this power is argued from the fact, that it is, from its definition, just as competent to abolish the inter-State slave-trade, as the African slave trade; and from the further fact, that to abolish the inter-State slave-trade is to cut the very jugular of American slavery.
We have seen, that the provision, respecting the African slave-trade, stands not in the way of the ab-
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olition of slavery. But, is it to be regarded, as even a pro-slavery taint on the Constitution? It is true, that this provision and that, under which the African slave-trade was abolished, and under which the inter-Slate slave-trade also should be abolished, lack juxtaposition on the pages of the Constitution. Nevertheless, they are to be viewed, as essentially connected with each other; and as inseparable parts of an anti-slavery agreement, into which the "old thirteen States" entered. That agreement might be expressed, as follows:
"The Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, with the exception, that it shall not be used to abolish the African slave-trade earlier than the year 1808."
This agreement was a great anti-slavery concession on the part of the "old thirteen States." At the time, they made it, they had as unquestioned a right, as any other sovereignties on the globe, to carry on the African slave-trade. Nevertheless, in this agreement, they empowered the Central or General Government, which they were creating, to abolish both the African and inter-State slave-trade, with no other reservation than that it shall not abolish the African slave-trade, prior to the year 1808. Clearly then, so far as this agreement gives character to the Constitution and the General Government, they are anti-slavery-not pro-slavery. If my drunken neighbors give me power to break their bottles,
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and stop their drinking, and, if need be, lock them up - with no other reservation, than that for nineteen weeks (, a week in the life of a man is more than a year in the life of a nation,) I shall not withhold from them a specified kind of liquor - is the paper, in which they give me this power, to be called an antitemperance paper? - or am I, for consenting to be its depositary, to be called an anti-temperance man? Manifestly not.
In all arguments to prove the pro-slavery character of the Constitution, great stress is laid on the provision for the apportionment of representatives. But, does this provision require the upholding of slavery? This is not pretended. Does it forbid the exercise, in any direction, of the anti-slavery powers of the Constitution? Nor is this pretended. What then? Why, it operates to the advantage of slavery! If this be so, then all, that need be said, is, that, in such operation, we have another reason for exercising the anti-slavery powers of the Constitution, and abolishing slavery.
It is contended, that this is a wrong provision. But, since it neither requires the upholding of slavery, nor forbids its abolition, it is entirely extraneous to the present argument, whether it is a right, or a wrong provision. I will admit, however, that it is a wrong provision: - but, not for the reason, which many give for calling it such. They call it wrong, because it counts slaves in the apportionment. A slave, they hold, should not be counted politically,
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as much as three-fifths of a man, nor even as much as the smallest proportion of a man: - whereas I call it wrong for the directly opposite reason, that it does not suffer the slave to count for a whole man. It is said, that, inasmuch as the slaves are not permitted to vote, they should not be counted in the apportionment. Why, then, should free people of color be counted in it - for they, with small exceptions, are not permitted to vote? Why, then, should women be counted in it - for they are all robbed of their right to vote? Why, then, should the poor white men, who, in some parts of the Nation, are denied the right to vote, be counted in the apportionment?
It is, indeed, a great hardship, that the slaves should be counted in the apportionment of representatives, and, yet, have no vote in the choice of them. But, as the fault in the case is exclusively with those States, which forbid their voting, so, also, is the remedy, exclusively with them. To say, that, because a State Government deprives some of its subjects of the right to vote, the Federal Government should refuse to count the disfranchised ones as men, or even parts of men, is to say, not only, that to a great wrong a greater may be added, but that a greater wrong is the remedy for a less one.
I close my remarks, under this head, by saying, that if the provision before us has, by reckoning the slave to be as much as a part of a man, a tendency to sustain slavery; so has it also, by reckoning him to be no more, a tendency to overthrow it. A slave
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State is under a powerful inducement to abolish slavery, to the end, that each of her citizens may become a unit, and that she may thereby have her proportionate representation in the councils of the Nation.
The right to "suppress insurrections" and "domestic violence" is among the inherent powers of Civil Government. Must that right be, therefore, exercised against the rising of the American slave for his liberty? If it be so decided, then, all I have to say, is, that such decision necessarily involves the decision, that the Federal Government must, in the exercise of its ample powers thereto, abolish slavery. If, so long as I sustain a certain relation, I must do wrong, then I must forthwith dissolve such relation. If the Federal Government must recognize and punish as the insurgent, the slave, who rises for his liberty, rather than the slaveholder, who rises to oppose him, then must that Government, if it be only to escape from the construed necessity of doing this wrong, hasten to abolish slavery. Had the Federal Government the power to abolish the trade in stolen goods, as it has the power to abolish slavery, then would its obligation (were it under such,) to protect every existing trade, be an obligation to abolish the trade in stolen goods.
The provision respecting fugitives from service is the only other one relied on to prove the pro-slavery character of the Constitution. But, this provision, under which the master can pursue his apprentice,
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and the parent his child, has not, from its language, any application to slaves. It was, however, intended to have such application, says the expounder of the Constitution. But, this brings us to that region of speculation, forbidden by the Resolution, which I offered, and advocated, at Buffalo. I will, notwithstanding, enter the forbidden region far enough to inquire, whether we can properly consent to be governed by an unexpressed intention - an unexpressed conjectured intention - an intention, withal, which could not have been expressed, without revolting the Convention, that framed the Constitution, and the people, who passed upon it. I will tarry long enough in this forbidden region of speculation to admit, that a few members of the Convention did undertake to smuggle slavery into the Constitution, through this provision. Surely, however, we are not bound to yield to their unsuccessful attempt, what we should, perhaps, have been obliged to yield, had their attempt been successful. The fact may be stated here, that they, who undertook to get slavery into the Constitution, without appearing to undertake it; and without using any of those offensive words or phrases, by which it would be seen to be there, undertook an impracticability.
The provision under consideration is numbered among the much talked of pro-slavery compromises of the Constitution. How far it is from being a proslavery compromise is manifest from several facts.
1st. It was introduced near the close of the labors of the Convention; and was, at once, adopted unan-
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imously - without being referred to a committee, and without debate.
2d. Only the day previous, the mover of a provision for recovering, in express terms, fugitive slaves, had to withdraw it precipitately before the opposition, which it aroused.
3d. Some days afterwards, when the Report of the committee on the style and arrangement of the Constitution was taken up, the word "servitude" in another part of the Constitution was struck out, and "service" put in its place. This was clone for the assigned reason, that "servitude" expresses the condition of slaves, and "service" the obligations of free persons. But in the provision before us, the reverse change was neither made, nor called for.
4th. I am not certain - but, I believe, that some twenty years elapsed before this provision was successfully applied to the case of a fugitive slave: and never would it have been thus applied, had not the anti-slavery spirit of the close of the eighteenth century died away.
5th. At the time of the Convention, American slavery was an expiring institution; and, probably, none of its members, excepting some three or four Georgians and South Carolinians, cared a straw how many slaves ran away.
I say no more on this point, but that even if this provision, or any other provision of the Constitution, had been, on the part of its framers, a pro-slavery compromise, it would not, therefore, have been such on the pact of the people, who adopted it.
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We need examine the Constitution no farther. It is enough, that we have adverted to some of its powers, whereby every part and parcel of American slavery can be abolished; and that we have seen, that there is nothing in the Constitution to forbid the exercise of these powers.
And, now, my dear Sir, is it not high time for the Liberty party to have done with running after the pro-slavery speculations on the intentions of the Constitution? Is it not high time to leave to the pro slavery parties the hunting up of slavery in the intentions of that instrument? Let that miserable work be theirs. But let the Liberty party take the Constitution as it is, and look into its fair free face, instead of mousing about behind its back among the heaps of pro-slavery speculations, which pro-slavery commentators have piled up there. Let the Liberty party, better employed than transforming this Charter of liberty into a device to perpetuate slavery, claim for the Federal Constitution ample power to cleanse the land of slavery: - and let it solemnly pledge itself, before Heaven and Earth, that if the people will give it the ascendency, and permit it to wield the power of the Constitution, American slavery shall quickly feel that power, and quickly be numbered with the things, which have been, but which are not.
With great regard,
Your friend,
GERRIT SMITH.
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